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DISTRESSING SPEECH AFTER SNYDER—WHAT’S 
LEFT OF IIED? 
Andrew Meerkins 
ABSTRACT—Speech has the potential to cause devastating emotional 
injury. Yet it has been less than a century since intentional infliction of 
emotional distress—a tort designed to punish a person who, through 
outrageous conduct or speech, intentionally causes severe distress to 
another—has entered the scene. When the tortfeasor acts through speech 
alone, the First Amendment is inevitably implicated. In 2011, the Supreme 
Court took its most recent stance on the constitutionality of punishing 
distressing speech when it decided Snyder v. Phelps. Despite the 
reprehensibility of the speech involved, the Court properly immunized the 
speech from tort liability for emotional distress. The Court has already 
suggested that IIED actions face a constitutional bar for public figures and 
for private figures embroiled in a matter of public concern. This Note picks 
up the IIED doctrine where Snyder left off and argues that the First 
Amendment should bar most IIED actions even against a private figure 
where the speech relates to a matter of private concern. This result flows 
from the difficulty in distinguishing between public and private matters, the 
danger of silencing unpopular speech, and the positive value that injurious 
speech can have. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Few would dispute the notion that speech can be harmful and 
distressing. Consider the malicious prankster who falsely told a woman her 
husband had suffered a serious car accident,1 the team doctor who 
intentionally misdiagnosed one of his football players with a fatal disease,2 
or the school administrators who accused a teenage girl of unchaste 
behavior and threatened her with imprisonment.3 It was against this 
backdrop of outrageously distressing conduct and speech that the law 
gradually began to recognize a tort action for the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress (IIED). But the law has guarded liability for emotional 
distress closely, and the courts have always expected America’s citizenry to 
endure the vast majority of insults, vulgarities, and other interpersonal 
stressors they encounter. 
IIED has proven especially problematic when plaintiffs seek to recover 
for distressing speech rather than for conduct. In a variety of pure-speech 
contexts, the Supreme Court has found that the First Amendment’s demand 
for the free exchange of ideas trumps the need to compensate individual 
emotional distress. Most recently, the behavior of the Westboro Baptist 
Church (Westboro) brought IIED into the public consciousness in the 2011 
case Snyder v. Phelps.4 
Westboro’s incendiary protests have made it a nationwide poster child 
for hate and intolerance despite its low membership. The church is best 
known for its vitriolic anti-gay protests at the funerals of military 
 
1 See Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] 2 Q.B. 57. 
2 See Chuy v. Phila. Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc). 
3 See Johnson v. Sampson, 208 N.W. 814 (Minn. 1926). 
4 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
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servicemen and servicewomen.5 The church teaches that the deaths of 
service men and women are God’s punishment for America’s tolerance of 
homosexuality,6 and the protesters carry signs with slogans such as “GOD 
HATES FAGS,” “FAGS BURN IN HELL,” “THANK GOD FOR DEAD 
SOLDIERS,” “GOD HATES AMERICA,” and “AMERICA IS 
DOOMED.”7 Westboro has picketed approximately 600 funerals in the past 
20 years.8 
The funeral of Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder was one of the 
600. Matthew died in the line of duty in Iraq.9 His parents held his funeral 
at St. John Catholic Church in his hometown of Westminster, Maryland.10 
Before the service, Matthew’s father, Albert, placed an obituary in the 
newspaper, and Westboro targeted the funeral for protest.11 
On the day of the service, Westboro devotees engaged in a small 
protest. In addition to their usual placards, they carried signs that were 
allegedly directed personally at Matthew—who was Catholic as well as a 
Marine—that read “God Hates You,” “You’re Going To Hell,” “Semper Fi 
Fags,” and “Priests Rape Boys.”12 Albert Snyder did not view the signs 
before or during the funeral, and Westboro did not interrupt the service, but 
the protest still aggrieved him.13 He filed suit for IIED, among other 
charges.14 A jury found for Albert Snyder, but the Fourth Circuit reversed 
the verdict.15 The Supreme Court then held 8–1 for Westboro, and Chief 
Justice Roberts’s majority opinion suggested that the First Amendment bars 
IIED actions for speech about matters of public concern.16 
While it was not addressed in the majority opinion, Westboro did not 
drop its focus on Matthew Snyder after his funeral. Shortly afterwards, it 
published an online “epic” that took more direct aim at Matthew Snyder 
and his family than had the somewhat generic signs at the funeral.17 Titled 
 
5 Id. at 1213. 
6 Id. 
7 About Westboro Baptist Church, GODHATESFAGS, http://www.godhatesfags.com/wbcinfo/about
wbc.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2013). 
8 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1213. On its website, Westboro claims that it has participated in 49,310 
demonstrations since June of 1991 and that it has picketed more than 400 funerals of service members 
killed in Iraq and Afghanistan. About Westboro Baptist Church, supra note 7. 
9 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1213. 
10 See Deana Pollard Sacks, Snyder v. Phelps, the Supreme Court’s Speech-Tort Jurisprudence, 
and Normative Considerations, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 193, 196 (2010). 
11 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1213. 
12 Id. at 1216–17; id. at 1226 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
13 Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (D. Md. 2008), rev’d, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009), 
aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207. 
14 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1214. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 1220–21. 
17 Snyder, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 572. 
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“The Burden of Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder,” the writing 
lambasted Matthew’s parents for having “taught [him] to defy his creator” 
and for “rais[ing] him for the devil.”18 It also accused the Snyders of having 
taught their son: 
how to support the largest pedophile machine in the history of the entire 
world, the Roman Catholic monstrosity. . . . They . . . taught Matthew to be 
an idolater. 
. . . . 
  Then after all that they sent him to fight for the United States of Sodom, 
a filthy country that is in lock step with his evil, wicked, and sinful manner 
of life . . . .19 
Although the Court’s opinion did not address the epic, Justice Breyer 
expressed concern about it during oral argument, worrying in particular 
about the protection the First Amendment would offer to distressing speech 
communicated via the Internet.20 Perhaps it was this discomfort with the 
implications of the Internet for speech-based IIED actions that led Justice 
Breyer to concur separately in the case.21 
This Note applauds the Supreme Court’s conclusion as correct and 
argues that the First Amendment poses an even higher bar to liability for 
injurious speech than the Court has so far found. Part I lays out the 
necessary background, beginning in Part I.A, which discusses the 
development of IIED, including the law’s hesitancy to recognize emotional 
damages and the high hurdles a plaintiff must clear to recover. Part I.B 
introduces the restrictions the First Amendment places on IIED actions. It 
also outlines the jurisprudence surrounding defamation, as the Court has 
borrowed the framework it established for defamation as an analytical tool 
in IIED actions. This includes drawing distinctions between public and 
private figures and matters of public and private concern. Part I.B 
concludes by discussing low-value speech doctrines and placing these 
doctrines in the IIED context with some possible implications of the 
holding in Snyder. 
In Part II, this Note suggests that the First Amendment should bar 
IIED claims even when injurious speech is intentionally directed at a 
private person and the speech relates to a matter of private concern. Despite 
the emotional harm such speech can inflict, Part II.A emphasizes the 
difficulty in distinguishing between matters of public and private concern, 
Part II.B the risks of viewpoint discrimination, and Part II.C the value of 
even intentionally injurious speech. Part II.D examines the implications for 
the workplace and the Internet. Despite the unique challenges presented by 
 
18 Id. 
19 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1226 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
20 Transcript of Oral Argument at 12–14, Snyder, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (No. 09-751). 
21 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1221 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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these and other situations, this Note counsels that the First Amendment 
should nonetheless bar most IIED claims. A brief conclusion follows. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. IIED: Development and Restrictions 
IIED is a tort of recent vintage. Courts were reticent to award damages 
for emotional distress a century ago, and the tort did not gain general 
acceptance until the mid-twentieth century. This section outlines the 
gradual recognition of IIED in the literature and in the courts. It also 
discusses the tight controls that courts placed on IIED even as they began 
to acknowledge it. 
1. The Birth of IIED.—For most of Anglo-American legal history, 
emotional distress unaccompanied by tangible harm was insufficient to 
support an action in tort22 for various reasons,23 and courts generally denied 
recovery even when the emotional harm was severe and intentional.24 Still, 
by the close of the nineteenth century, emotional damages were sometimes 
recoverable.25 So long as a plaintiff could make an independent cause of 
action fit the facts (even nominally) and serve as a predicate injury, 
additional awards for emotional distress were common.26 
Early cases that prompted the rise of interest in emotional distress 
damages included particularly abhorrent practical jokes, extreme insults, 
threats, abusive commercial practices, and the exploitation of authority, 
 
22 See, e.g., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 54–55 (W. Page Keeton et al. 
eds., 5th ed. 1984) (“[T]he law has been slow to accept the interest in peace of mind as entitled to 
independent legal protection . . . .”); Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Defense Against Outrage and the 
Perils of Parasitic Torts, 45 GA. L. REV. 107, 125–26 (2010) (noting the denial of recovery for mental 
suffering in the absence of physical harm or contact). 
23 Among the objections was the difficulty of measuring damages. See, e.g., Lynch v. Knight, 
(1861) 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (H.L.) 863 (appeal taken from Ir.) (“Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot 
value, and does not pretend to redress . . . .”). Other courts found the emotional distress to be too remote 
to be foreseeable, thus rendering the conduct not a proximate cause of the harm. See, e.g., Braun v. 
Craven, 51 N.E. 657, 659 (Ill. 1898) (“Appellee might have reasonably anticipated that his acts would 
cause excitement, or even fright; but fright and excitement so seldom result in a practically incurable 
disease that . . . such a result could not have been expected.”). Finally, there was the fear of a “slippery 
slope” wherein courts would be inundated with a flood of litigation by people who had suffered from 
slighted feelings. See Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 45 N.E. 354, 354–55 (N.Y. 1896) (“If the right of 
recovery [for fright is] established, it would naturally result in a flood of litigation in cases where the 
injury complained of may be easily feigned without detection, and where the damages must rest upon 
mere conjecture or speculation.”). 
24 See William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 
874, 874 (1939). 
25 Id. at 880. 
26 See William L. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 40, 42–43 (1956); see also, e.g., 
Kurpgeweit v. Kirby, 129 N.W. 177, 180 (Neb. 1910) (affirming a jury award for emotional “assault” 
based on the predicate injury of technical trespass). 
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special relationships, or peculiar vulnerabilities. A prankster who falsely 
told a woman her husband had been seriously hurt incurred liability,27 as 
did others who buried a secret “pot of gold” that they persuaded an 
emotionally frail woman to dig up, causing her public humiliation and a 
mental breakdown.28 In the early twentieth century, the law also came to 
compensate victims of threats and insults when the defendant had a special 
relationship or duty toward the distressed plaintiff.29 Contrary to the 
previously held view that liability could arise in these situations only by 
contract, some courts found liability for shouting profanity at a person in 
the home,30 and several courts found that “indecent proposals” directed at 
women warranted damages.31 Misuse of authority was the common theme 
of several other claims, including one involving a detective who accused a 
woman of wartime espionage out of personal animus32 and another in 
which school administrators accused a high school girl of unchaste 
behavior and threatened her with imprisonment.33 
Courts also proved willing to find liability without physical injury in 
cases against creditors who used harassing, humiliating, or cruel collection 
methods or against insurance agents who applied pressure to force a 
settlement.34 Finally, several early cases found liability for the mishandling, 
mutilation, or misplacement of dead bodies.35 While these types of cases 
sometimes pointed to property rights, contractual rights, or other nominal 
 
27 See Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] 2 Q.B. 57. 
28 See Nickerson v. Hodges, 84 So. 37, 38–39 (La. 1920). 
29 See, e.g., Dixon v. Hotel Tutwiler Operating Co., 108 So. 26, 28 (Ala. 1926) (innkeeper); Weber-
Stair Co. v. Fisher, 119 S.W. 195 (Ky. 1909) (theater owner); Gillespie v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 70 
N.E. 857, 863 (N.Y. 1904) (common carrier). 
30 See, e.g., Voss v. Bolzenius, 128 S.W. 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1910) (finding the defendant liable for 
yelling offensive names while driving past the plaintiff’s house); Levine v. Trammell, 41 S.W.2d 334, 
334–35 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) (holding a landlord liable for verbally abusing a tenant during an 
eviction). 
31 See, e.g., Leach v. Leach, 33 S.W. 703 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895) (finding liability for attempt to 
seduce a married woman); Craker v. Chi. & Nw. Ry., 36 Wis. 657 (1875) (holding that an unwanted 
kiss gave rise to liability). 
32 See Janvier v. Sweeney, [1919] 2 K.B. 316. 
33 See Johnson v. Sampson, 208 N.W. 814 (Minn. 1926). 
34 See, e.g., Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men of Washington, D.C., 105 F.2d 62, 66–67 (D.C. 
Cir. 1939) (reversing the dismissal of an emotional distress claim after a man suffered physical injuries 
from the emotionally distressing conduct of bill collectors); Barnett v. Collection Serv. Co., 242 N.W. 
25, 28 (Iowa 1932) (affirming a jury award of emotional distress damages for the harassing conduct of a 
bill collector). 
35 See, e.g., Larson v. Chase, 50 N.W. 238 (Minn. 1891) (finding a right to possession of a dead 
body for family members and allowing an action for emotional distress damages when the body was 
mishandled); Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church of the Sacred Hearts of Jesus & Mary, 186 N.E. 
798 (N.Y. 1933) (affirming a jury verdict awarding emotional distress damages for family members 
after the deceased relative’s body was moved to a different cemetery plot). 
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torts, commentators observed that the courts were really compensating 
purely emotional distress.36 
Scholar and jurist Thomas Atkins Street declared mental anguish 
“parasitic,” meaning that it could help determine damages but could not 
independently support liability.37 He also correctly predicted that allowing 
mental anguish to enter the damages calculus would lead to its emergence 
as an independent basis for liability.38 Still, when the American Law 
Institute (ALI) published its first Restatement of the Law of Torts in 1934, 
it excluded emotional distress as a basis for liability because “the interest in 
freedom from disagreeable emotions is not . . . sufficiently important to 
make even its intentional invasion actionable unless the act [alleged] . . . 
also constitutes an invasion of some more perfectly protected interest.”39 
Despite this official denunciation,40 by the 1930s it was no longer 
accurate to describe IIED as insufficient to support liability.41 Many courts 
and scholars had begun to recognize emotional distress as an independent 
ground for recovery.42 Academia helped shape IIED’s evolution,43 and in 
1938, Dean Prosser, who would be one of the tort’s primary architects, 
heralded its emergent autonomy in his article, Intentional Infliction of 
Mental Suffering: A New Tort.44 
Against this changing legal backdrop, the Restatement’s contributors 
reversed their 1934 position on IIED in the 1948 supplement. Section 46 of 
the volume recognizes the independent tort of IIED, imposing liability on a 
person “who, without a privilege to do so, intentionally causes severe 
 
36 See Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. 
REV. 1033, 1035 (1936); Prosser, supra note 24, at 881–86. 
37 1 THOMAS ATKINS STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 461 (1906). 
38 Id. at 470. 
39 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS ch. 2, intro. note, at 26 (1934). 
40 Id. § 46 cmt. c (noting that conduct “intended . . . to cause . . . emotional distress is not tortious”). 
41 The English case Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] 2 Q.B. 57, is recognized as pioneering the 
recognition of purely emotional harm as sufficient for the award of damages. See PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 22, § 12, at 60. 
42 See Magruder, supra note 36, at 1067 (“[C]ourts have already given extensive protection to 
feelings and emotions.”); Rapp, supra note 22, at 131. 
43 See Rapp, supra note 22, at 131–32. Some have argued that scholars invented IIED, while others 
have contended that Prosser and his contemporaries did not invent the notion of emotional distress, but 
rather expanded the principles of isolated cases to a cogent doctrine. Compare Daniel Givelber, The 
Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 42, 43 (1982) (arguing that scholars 
declared the availability of compensation for emotional distress and the Restatement followed suit), 
with Paul T. Hayden, Religiously Motivated “Outrageous” Conduct: Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress as a Weapon Against “Other People’s Faiths,” 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 579, 587 (1993) 
(arguing that scholars merely expanded the principle of compensation for emotional distress). 
44 See Prosser, supra note 24; see generally Fowler V. Harper & Mary Coate McNeely, A Re-
Examination of the Basis for Liability for Emotional Distress, 1938 WIS. L. REV. 426 (developing the 
idea of liability for emotional harm); Magruder, supra note 36 (illustrating the willingness of courts to 
compensate emotional harm). 
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emotional distress to another.”45 In 1965, under the guidance of Dean 
Prosser as Reporter, the committee for the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
redefined the test for IIED.46 Section 46 extends liability to anyone “who by 
extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly cause[d] severe 
emotional distress” and to any resulting bodily harm.47 Commentary to 
section 46 makes it clear that outrageous conduct is a prerequisite to 
liability.48 Malicious or even criminal intent to cause suffering is 
insufficient in the absence of conduct “so outrageous in character, and so 
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency . . . in a 
civilized community.”49 The commentary further explains that a case meets 
the outrageousness standard where “recitation of the facts to an average 
member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, 
and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’”50 
Today, all fifty states and the District of Columbia recognize IIED in 
at least some situations.51 Many jurisdictions have adopted section 46’s 
definition in one form or another.52 Most break the tort into four elements53: 
(1) the defendant either intended to inflict emotional distress or caused it 
recklessly, (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous, (3) the actions of 
the defendant caused the plaintiff’s distress, and (4) the distress was 
severe.54 Actions for IIED largely turn on the outrageousness of the conduct 
alleged55—so much so that the tort is also commonly known as “outrage.”56 
2. Early Limitations on the Tort.—Widespread recognition of IIED 
did not eliminate concerns about compensating emotional distress.57 
Scholars and jurists persisted in their fears that allowing recovery would 
open the floodgates to expansive litigation over hurt feelings.58 The 
 
45 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (Proposed Final Draft No. 7, 1947). 
46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). 
47 Id. § 46(1). 
48 See id. § 46 cmt. d. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 See John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional Harm, 90 MARQ. L. 
REV. 789, 806, app. B (2007). 
52 See id. at 806. 
53 See Givelber, supra note 43, at 46. 
54 See, e.g., Limone v. United States, 579 F.3d 79, 94 (1st Cir. 2009); Milo v. Martin, 311 S.W.3d 
210, 217 (Tex. App. 2010). 
55 See Christina Wells, Regulating Offensiveness: Snyder v. Phelps, Emotion, and the First 
Amendment, 1 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 71, 83 (2010) (“Outrageous action is the core element of IIED.”). 
56 See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from Civil Rights to 
Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115, 2117 (2007); Prosser, supra note 26. 
57 See supra note 23. 
58 See Prosser, supra note 24, at 877. 
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outrageousness requirement became the bulwark against such frivolities.59 
Dean Prosser readily acknowledged that each of us “must necessarily be 
expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of rough 
language, and to occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate and 
unkind.”60 
While courts have made it clear that outrageous conduct must be 
extreme to support liability, they have done relatively little to articulate 
more concrete standards.61 Due to this lack of guidance, courts have 
produced an IIED jurisprudence that is “extremely fluid and invariably 
responds to changing cultural sensibilities.”62 Because IIED is an ever-
evolving tort, it seems likely that many of the early cases cited by Prosser 
and Magruder no longer qualify as outrageous under modern standards of 
propriety. By the same token, cases involving sexual voyeurism and 
degradation not necessarily considered outrageous in the tort’s infancy now 
result in liability.63 While one might expect such a malleable standard to 
lead to the long-feared avalanche of litigation, most observers conclude that 
the IIED floodgates have never opened.64 
This nebulous quality of IIED has led courts in several jurisdictions to 
relegate it to the status of “gap-filler” tort.65 Texas, for example, bars 
plaintiffs who are capable of articulating a different theory of recovery 
from proceeding under IIED.66 This approach is typical of the states that 
 
59 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965) (“The liability clearly does not 
extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.”). 
60 Prosser, supra note 24, at 887. 
61 See Givelber, supra note 43, at 74 (“Courts are literally left to their own devices to figure out 
whether conduct qualifies as outrageous.”). 
62 Chamallas, supra note 56, at 2126. 
63 See Russell Fraker, Note, Reformulating Outrage: A Critical Analysis of the Problematic Tort of 
IIED, 61 VAND. L. REV. 983, 992 (2008) (citing Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co. v. 1906 Co., 273 F.3d 
605, 612–14 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding photography studio liable for IIED when employee used hidden 
cameras in models’ dressing rooms); Coates v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 976 P.2d 999, 1002–03, 1009 
(N.M. 1999) (finding IIED liability for a supervisor’s sexually explicit speech towards employees, 
breast-groping, and other sexual harassment of subordinates)). 
64 See Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-
Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 171 (1982) (“Empirical studies show that the volume of 
litigation in response to the judicial recognition of new torts has not been overwhelming.”); Jean C. 
Love, Discriminatory Speech and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 47 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 123, 127 (1990) (noting that there were only about 600 reported cases citing the 
Restatement (Second) section 46 during the 1980s). 
65 See Fraker, supra note 63, at 1009. 
66 See Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson, 157 S.W.3d 814, 815–16 (Tex. 2005) (finding that IIED claims 
are barred if any other cause of action could provide recovery, whether statutory or common law, and 
even if not before the court or procedurally barred); Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 
S.W.3d 438, 448–50 (Tex. 2004) (holding that claims for IIED are precluded when the “gravamen” of 
the case is any other tort); see also Sara Ruliffson, Comment, R.I.P. I.I.E.D.: The Supreme Court of 
Texas Severely Limits the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 587, 
592–99 (2006) (discussing the impact of these decisions on Texas tort law). 
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treat IIED as a tort of last resort.67 Other jurisdictions have been 
inconsistent in determining whether IIED is strictly a gap filler.68 While a 
majority of jurisdictions and the Restatement (Second) recognize IIED as 
an independent tort,69 this doctrinal confusion shows that even today courts 
remain hesitant to compensate emotional distress. 
B. Constitutional Limitations on IIED and Other Speech Torts 
Actions for IIED have proven especially problematic when the 
malefactor acts through speech alone. It is not surprising that courts have 
been reluctant to punish injurious speech: First Amendment speech 
protections are favored and vital, while emotional distress is a traditionally 
disfavored basis on which to award relief. That courts have been reluctant 
to punish injurious speech absent other conduct should come as no surprise 
given the vitality of First Amendment speech protections and our 
discomfort with compensating emotional distress. In the 1980s, the 
Supreme Court’s Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell decision explicitly 
acknowledged that imposing liability for hurtful speech risks chilling 
expression, implicating the First Amendment. This section discusses that 
decision and the intertwined Court doctrine for defamation actions. It then 
discusses Snyder and the state of the law for IIED claims after the decision. 
1. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell.—In 1983, Hustler magazine ran a 
full-page parody of an advertisement for liqueur featuring the Reverend 
Jerry Falwell giving a fictional interview about his “first time.”70 While the 
“ads” ultimately revealed that the “first times” discussed were the subjects’ 
first samplings of the liqueur, they meant to invoke the impression that the 
celebrities were discussing their sexual firsts.71 In the magazine parody, 
Falwell revealed in his “interview” that his “first time” took place in a 
“drunken incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse.”72 The 
“ad” also featured a “statement” from Falwell that he preached only while 
drunk and suggested that he was a hypocrite.73 
 
67 See, e.g., Dickens v. Puryear, 276 S.E.2d 325, 327–28, 336 (N.C. 1981) (holding an IIED claim 
barred when assault and battery were applicable, despite the fact that the statute of limitations had 
lapsed for both claims but not for the IIED claim). 
68 See Fraker, supra note 63, at 997 & n.57. 
69 See id. at 996 & nn.53–55. 
70 Jerry Falwell Talks About His First Time, HUSTLER, November 1983, at inside of front cover; 
see Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48 (1988). Actual ads for Campari had featured 
other celebrities giving similar interviews. Id. 
71 Hustler, 485 U.S. at 48. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
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A unanimous Supreme Court held that parodies like the one in the 
magazine are entitled to a high level of First Amendment protection.74 
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist stressed the importance of 
the free flow of ideas about issues of public concern.75 He then emphasized 
the right of American citizens to subject their public officials and figures to 
criticism, even when that criticism is not “reasoned or moderate.”76 In 
dismissing Falwell’s argument that the magazine’s malicious intent should 
place it beyond constitutional protection, Chief Justice Rehnquist found 
that intent to harm does not render speech unprotected.77 
The Court also held that outrageousness, the showing required for 
success in an IIED claim, amounted to an invitation to jurors to silence 
unpopular or offensive speech, a result forbidden by the First 
Amendment.78 The Court borrowed ideas from the canonical defamation 
case, New York Times v. Sullivan,79 in fashioning its opinion. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist wrote that because of the overriding importance of free-flowing 
public debate, “public figures and public officials may not recover for the 
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress . . . without showing . . . 
‘actual malice,’ i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false or with 
reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.”80 The Court set this 
actual malice standard to give the requisite “‘breathing space’ to the 
freedoms protected by the First Amendment.”81 
2. Detour: Importing Defamation Law into IIED  
Jurisprudence.—The doctrinal framework relied upon by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist in the Hustler decision had been established as the Court 
gradually “constitutionalized” the law of defamation. Falwell argued that 
this analysis was inapposite because he was suing for emotional distress 
damages and not reputational damage, but the Court found the same First 
Amendment interests in protecting the free exchange of ideas to be 
implicated in each type of case.82 Commentators have noted the imprecise 
fit of the actual malice standard for IIED claims—the Court in Hustler did 
not explain why it was adopting it.83 IIED claims compensate victims for 
 
74 See id. at 50. Justice Kennedy took no part in the decision, and Justice White filed a concurring 
opinion. Id. at 47. 
75 Id. at 50–51. 
76 Id. at 51. 
77 Id. at 53. 
78 Id. at 55–56 (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745–46 (1978); Street v. New York, 
394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)). 
79 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
80 Hustler, 485 U.S. at 56. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 52–53. 
83 See Catherine L. Amspacher & Randel Steven Springer, Note, Humor, Defamation and 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: The Potential Predicament for Private Figure Plaintiffs, 
31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 701, 715–17 (1990). Concurring in the judgment in Hustler, Justice White 
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different harms than defamation actions: the former addresses the internal 
harm and emotional suffering of the speech while the latter punishes its 
outer, reputational effects.84 Moreover, successful IIED claims do not hinge 
on truth or falsity as do defamation claims.85 Professor Smolla argues that it 
is “logically indefensible” to lift the New York Times actual malice standard 
from defamation and apply it literally to IIED.86 New York Times involved 
the publication of an allegedly defamatory advertisement, and the actual 
malice standard was crafted to ensure protection for a newspaper that might 
inadvertently publish falsehoods,87 a concern that is inapplicable in IIED 
actions. But the adoption makes more sense if looked at from the 
perspective of the speaker, as the danger of chilling speech looms large in 
both types of actions.88 Despite his criticisms, Smolla applauds the big-
picture utilization of New York Times’s ideals because doing so reaffirms 
the First Amendment’s prohibition on the punishment of speech solely 
because of its emotional content.89 Professor Post argues that the references 
to actual malice make sense because, like Hustler, the driving concern in 
both cases is the protection of public discourse.90 Whatever the ultimate 
 
commented that New York Times v. Sullivan had “little to do with this case,” as he saw its holding to be 
limited to factual assertions and not parody or statements of opinion. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 57 (White, J., 
concurring). 
84 Amspacher & Springer, supra note 83, at 716. 
85 Rodney A. Smolla, Emotional Distress and the First Amendment: An Analysis of Hustler v. 
Falwell, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 423, 430 (1988). Before the case’s ascendance to the Supreme Court, the 
Fourth Circuit latched onto this idea in Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986). The court 
determined that the New York Times case had not modified the elements of a cause of action for 
defamation, but simply raised the fault level required. Accordingly, it imported the “reckless” or 
“intentional” fault levels from the case into the IIED context to find Hustler liable for intentionally 
causing Falwell emotional distress. Id. at 1274–76. 
86 Smolla, supra note 85, at 439. 
87 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256–57, 279–81 (1964). During the Civil Rights 
Movement, the New York Times published a full-page advertisement accusing the police of 
Montgomery, Alabama, of harassing and stifling the efforts of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and fellow 
activists. Id. at 257–58. Though the advertisement did not mention him by name, the elected police 
commissioner accused the Times of defaming him. Id. at 258. 
88 See Robert L. Rabin, Emotional Distress in Tort Law: Themes of Constraint, 44 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 1197, 1203–05 (2009) (discussing the barriers that have been erected to tort actions for 
defamation, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy because 
of the potential chilling effect that these claims can have on expression and the media); see also Daryl 
L. Wiesen, Note, Following the Lead of Defamation: A Definitional Balancing Approach to Religious 
Torts, 105 YALE L.J. 291, 316–21 (1995) (proposing “religious torts,” a jurisprudential framework 
analogous to defamation, because of the similar First Amendment concerns of stifling expression and 
the free exercise of religion). 
89 Smolla, supra note 85, at 440–42. 
90 Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, 
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 612–13 (1990). 
See generally David A. Logan, Tort Law and the Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 51 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 493 (1990) (proposing a single, unified constitutional theory to govern all tort actions based on 
speech). 
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rationale, the Court’s importation of defamation principles suggested that 
the distinctions between private and public concern and between public and 
private figures would continue to inform IIED analysis. Such distinctions 
have governed defamation law since New York Times v. Sullivan, where the 
Court first began placing First Amendment restrictions on defamation 
claims, and the standards have been developed further in subsequent 
decisions. 
Before 1964, there was little suggestion that the First Amendment 
might present a bar to defamation claims.91 Justice Brennan’s New York 
Times opinion changed this by holding that a newspaper’s false statements 
of fact about a public official were protected unless “made with ‘actual 
malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false or not.”92 Mistakes and impugned 
reputations, the Court wrote, were the unavoidable side effects of giving 
speech the “breathing space” it needed to survive. To hold a newspaper to 
higher standards would strike an unacceptable balance because it would 
risk chilling speech. The Court noted that “debate on public issues should 
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” even when it includes “vehement, 
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks.”93 
Just three years later, the Court in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts 
extended the actual malice standard to include public figures as well as 
public officials.94 In 1971, a Justice Brennan-led plurality decided 
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.95 and extended the actual malice standard 
again; this time, private figures embroiled in an event of general public 
interest could not collect without showing actual malice.96 Justice 
Brennan’s opinion refused to give greater weight to society’s interest in 
protecting individual reputations than to the First Amendment interest in 
preventing self-censorship.97 
However, Justice Brennan’s Rosenbloom opinion could not command 
a majority and induced spirited dissents from Justices Harlan and 
Marshall.98 Then, only three years later, the Court declined to extend the 
 
91 See Alain Sheer & Asghar Zardkoohi, An Analysis of the Economic Efficiency of the Law of 
Defamation, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 364, 368 (1985). 
92 N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279–80. 
93 Id. at 270. 
94 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). In Butts, the privately employed athletic director at the University of 
Georgia brought a libel suit against Curtis Publishing after an article in the Saturday Evening Post 
accused him of fixing a football game between Georgia and Alabama. Id. at 135–36. 
95 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
96 A distributor of nudist magazines was arrested and tried for the alleged sale of obscene materials 
but was ultimately acquitted. He was unable to recover in his libel action against the radio station that 
reported that the materials seized from him had been obscene. Id. at 32–36. 
97 Id. at 49–50. 
98 See id. at 71–72 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for “single-minded devotion” to 
avoiding the evils of self-censorship and eschewing the proper balancing that should weigh reputational 
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actual malice rule in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.99 The case presented an 
issue that fit seamlessly into the Rosenbloom paradigm,100 but Justice 
Powell’s opinion modified the Rosenbloom analysis. Private figures could 
collect actual damages, such as demonstrable loss of income or business 
opportunity, by showing that the publishing had been negligent; but they 
were required to show actual malice to win punitive or presumed 
damages.101 The Court relied on two crucial differences between public and 
private figures to justify the distinction: public figures (1) enjoy superior 
access to the media themselves and therefore have a channel to combat 
defamatory attacks and (2) have typically enmeshed themselves in public 
affairs or thrust themselves into the spotlight, whereas private figures have 
not.102 The Gertz opinion represented the state of the law of defamation for 
roughly a decade. 
In 1985, the Court finally reached the issue of liability for defamation 
in a case between two private figures concerning a private matter. In Dun 
& Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,103 Justice Powell’s plurality 
opinion held that because such private situations are unlikely to chill 
speech, the First Amendment does not bar the imposition of both actual and 
punitive damages for falsehoods that were negligently published without 
actual malice.104 Thus, after Dun & Bradstreet, the permissible bounds of 
liability for defamation are more or less clear: (1) public officials and 
figures must show actual malice to collect, (2) private figures defamed 
about a matter of public concern can collect actual damages for negligently 
published falsehoods but must show actual malice to collect punitive or 
presumed damages, and (3) private figures defamed about a matter of 
private concern can collect actual and punitive damages by demonstrating 
that the defendant published negligently.105 
Determining what qualifies as defamation in the first place implicates 
a separate line of doctrine. This qualification matters because defamatory 
speech is entitled to no constitutional protection, whereas merely false 
speech or statements of opinion, even those that can cause emotional 
distress, generally are. Under previously firm doctrine, defamation claims 
 
interests more heavily); id. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (doubting the judiciary’s ability to accurately 
differentiate matters of public and private concern). 
99 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
100 A conservative magazine printed false statements accusing a private-figure attorney of 
subversive communist activities in connection with his representation in a high-profile lawsuit. Id. at 
325–26. 
101 Id. at 349–50. 
102 Id. at 344–45. 
103 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (plurality opinion). Dun & Bradstreet, a credit reporting agency, 
inadvertently sent a report to five of its subscribers erroneously indicating that Greenmoss, a 
construction contractor, had filed a petition for bankruptcy. Id. at 751. 
104 Id. at 761. 
105 See, e.g., Sheer & Zardkoohi, supra note 91, at 398. 
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were permissible under the First Amendment because there was thought to 
be “no constitutional value in false statements of fact.”106 In Gertz, Justice 
Powell included falsities in the categories of speech that receive no 
protection at all.107 This notion was affirmed by several of Gertz’s 
progeny.108 However, the Court recently revisited this issue and found 
otherwise in United States v. Alvarez.109 A Justice Kennedy-led plurality 
reasoned that defamatory or fraudulent speech is not unprotected solely 
because the speech is false, but also because of its defamatory nature or 
other legally cognizable harm associated with it.110 Thus, a law targeting 
false speech, without more, had to meet the usual demanding tests of 
speech restrictions.111 Justice Kennedy acknowledged the evils of false 
speech but prescribed “speech that is true” as the proper remedy because of 
its ability to enlighten and correct the lie.112 While a false statement of fact 
may be a new recipient of constitutional protection, unpopular and 
pernicious opinions have long received full protection.113 
The Court has long been careful to protect statements of opinion, 
including those that tread perilously close to defamation. Greenbelt 
Cooperative Publishing Ass’n v. Bresler forbade a state from imposing 
liability for “rhetorical hyperbole” on the grounds that a reader would not 
understand the publication to be stating actual facts but would read it with 
its rhetorical goal in mind.114 In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 
the Court required defamation plaintiffs to prove that the allegedly 
defamatory statements or publications were false.115 The Hepps Court 
recognized that this burden would insulate from liability those false 
 
106 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340. 
107 Id. at 340. 
108 See, e.g., BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 531 (2002) (“[F]alse statements may be 
unprotected for their own sake . . . .”); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776 (1984) 
(noting that false statements are valueless because they “harm both the subject of the falsehood and the 
readers of the statement”); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (“[T]he knowingly false 
statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional 
protection.”). 
109 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). At issue was the Stolen Valor Act, 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006), which 
criminalized lying about receiving certain military decorations. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2542. Alvarez was 
indicted under the Act when he inexplicably lied at a public meeting about being wounded during battle 
and receiving the Congressional Medal of Honor. Id. 
110 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545. 
111 Id. at 2549 (noting that the government had a compelling interest in protecting the integrity of 
the Medal of Honor, but that the Stolen Valor Act was too broad and reached too much protected 
speech). 
112 Id. at 2550. Justice Kennedy noted that counter-speech had been an adequate remedy in the case 
at bar; Alvarez had been ostracized and exposed as a “phony.” Id. at 2549. 
113 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974). 
114 398 U.S. 6, 11–14 (1970). 
115 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986). 
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statements that were not provably false, but it considered this effect a 
necessary evil to avoid chilling protected speech.116 
Finally, just two years after Hustler refused to impose liability in part 
because no reasonable person could read the parody in that case to state 
actual facts, the Court decided Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.117 Writing 
for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist found that not all opinions are 
constitutionally protected from tort liability.118 Noting that subsequent 
courts had misinterpreted Justice Powell’s dictum in Gertz to equate 
opinions with ideas, the Court rejected the notion of blanket constitutional 
protection for all statements of opinion.119 Because it would be 
counterintuitive “if a writer could escape liability . . . simply by using . . . 
the words ‘I think,’” a statement of opinion asserting an objectively false 
fact is actionable.120 Milkovich thus prevented speakers from avoiding 
liability by masquerading false statements of fact as opinion. It was this 
defamation-based decision that the Fourth Circuit would heavily rely upon 
nearly two decades later when it confronted the IIED case of a grieving 
military father suing a small Topeka-based church for disrupting his son’s 
funeral. 
3. Snyder v. Phelps.—At the time of Matthew Snyder’s funeral, 
Westboro’s small congregation consisted of between sixty and seventy 
members, roughly fifty of whom are blood relatives to founder Fred 
Phelps.121 When Westboro learned of Snyder’s funeral, the picketers it 
elected to send to Maryland included Phelps, two of his children, and four 
of his grandchildren.122 The group staged demonstrations at three locations: 
the streets abutting Maryland’s State House, the United States Naval 
Academy at Annapolis, and Snyder’s funeral.123 
Significantly, Westboro notified the authorities of its intent to picket 
Snyder’s funeral ahead of time and fully complied with police instructions 
to stand in a 10-by-25-foot fenced-in area approximately 1,000 feet from 
the funeral site and separated from it by several buildings.124 The protesters 
displayed signs, sang hymns, and recited Bible verses for approximately 
 
116 Id. at 778. 
117 497 U.S. 1 (1990). An editorial column in an Ohio newspaper accused a high school wrestling 
coach of lying his way out of trouble at an investigatory hearing. Id. at 3–5. The hearing was conducted 
to investigate an altercation that had occurred between two wrestling teams in which several people 
were injured. Id. at 4. 
118 Id. at 18–19. 
119 Id. at 18. 
120 Id. at 19 (quoting Cianci v. New Times Publ’g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1980) (Friendly, 
J.)). 
121 Sacks, supra note 10. 
122 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213 (2011). 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
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half an hour before the funeral, but they did not yell or interrupt the funeral 
in any way.125 
While the protestors were not visible from the site of the funeral, the 
funeral procession did pass within a few hundred feet of them.126 The fallen 
Marine’s father, Albert Snyder, testified that he could see the tops of the 
placards as he drove to the funeral but could not actually read what the 
signs said.127 When Snyder saw the picketing later that evening on 
television, it caused him severe emotional harm, which was exacerbated by 
his subsequent discovery of the online epic.128 
Snyder testified that he became so upset after viewing the epic that he 
vomited and cried for hours.129 He also asserted ongoing mental suffering 
and stated that he remained depressed and became irate whenever he 
thought about the incident.130 Several times throughout the trial, a tearful 
Snyder had to leave the courtroom to compose himself.131 Expert witnesses 
corroborated Snyder’s testimony, suggesting that the incident had caused 
him severe depression and adversely affected his preexisting health 
problems.132 
Snyder filed suit alleging five state tort claims: IIED, intrusion upon 
seclusion, civil conspiracy, defamation, and publicity given to private 
life.133 The district judge granted summary judgment for Westboro on the 
defamation and publicity given to private life claims, but a jury returned a 
verdict for Snyder on the remaining three counts and awarded $2.9 million 
in compensatory damages and $8 million in punitive damages.134 Though a 
flurry of post-trial motions by Westboro convinced the judge to remit the 
punitive damages award to $2.1 million, the court left the jury’s verdict 
otherwise undisturbed.135 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the verdict and found both 
Westboro’s picketing and the epic to be constitutionally protected 
speech.136 The decision relied primarily on two factors: first, the speech 





128 Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (D. Md. 2008), rev’d, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009), 
aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207. 
129 Id. 
130 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1214. 
131 Snyder, 580 F.3d at 213, aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207. 
132 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1214. 
133 Id. 
134 Snyder, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 573. 
135 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1214. 
136 Snyder, 580 F.3d at 211. 
137 Id. at 222–25. 
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Citing Milkovich, the court cast the speech as hyperbolic rhetoric, which 
enjoys absolute protection from tort liability.138 
The Fourth Circuit’s decision provoked a substantial amount of 
commentary. Some of the literature criticized the extension of Hustler’s 
First Amendment protection in IIED suits to cases that involved private 
figures like Snyder.139 When the Supreme Court granted certiorari, several 
other commentators were perplexed by the Court’s decision to consider the 
case, especially in light of Westboro’s emphatic First Amendment victory 
in the Fourth Circuit.140 Finally, a host of commentators applauded the 
Fourth Circuit’s decision and urged the Supreme Court to raise the First 
Amendment bar to IIED claims even higher.141 
The Court returned an 8–1 decision in favor of Westboro.142 Chief 
Justice Roberts’s opinion focused largely on whether or not the speech was 
a matter of public concern. This inquiry was essential because speech on 
public issues “occupies the highest rung” on the speech hierarchy and 
receives “special protection,” while First Amendment protections of speech 
regarding purely private matters “are often less rigorous.”143 The Court 
acknowledged that the line between public and private concern may often 
defy precise definition, but it prescribed a few principles to guide the 
inquiry.144 
Chief Justice Roberts suggested that the public concern umbrella is 
broad enough to encompass speech “fairly considered as relating to any 
matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, or [to] . . . a 
subject of legitimate news interest.”145 Private speech, on the other hand, 
includes speech that relates solely to private business matters and speech by 
 
138 Id. at 222–26. 
139 See, e.g., W. Wat Hopkins, Snyder v. Phelps, Private Persons and Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress: A Chance for the Supreme Court to Set Things Right, 9 FIRST AMENDMENT L. 
REV. 149, 189–92 (2010) (arguing that private persons should face a lesser burden to recovery in IIED 
claims as they do in libel claims); Jeffrey Shulman, Free Speech at What Cost?: Snyder v. Phelps and 
Speech-Based Tort Liability, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 313, 313–16 (arguing that the Fourth 
Circuit improperly balanced the interests of vigorous public debate against the right of individuals to be 
free from abuse). 
140 See, e.g., Hopkins, supra note 139, at 150. 
141 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress Tort, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 300, 303–06 (lamenting the subjectivity of an 
outrageousness standard and arguing that it is an inappropriate mechanism for regulating speech against 
either public or private figures); Wells, supra note 55, at 86 (urging that no liability for emotional 
distress should be allowed without “external indicia of harm” or in the event that speech falls into an 
unprotected category). 
142 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
143 Id. at 1215 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)) (citing Hustler Magazine, 
Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988)). 
144 Id. at 1216 (quoting City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83 (2004) (per curiam)). 
145 Id. at 1216 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 146; San Diego, 543 U.S. at 83–84) (internal 
quotation mark omitted). 
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a public employee unrelated to his position or employing agency.146 Chief 
Justice Roberts also cautioned that the nature of the distinction between 
public and private concern defies a one-size-fits-all test and that each case 
will require a facts- and circumstances-specific analysis.147 
The majority opinion placed Westboro’s speech firmly in the realm of 
public concern. Because Westboro’s aim was to reach as broad an audience 
as possible and because the signs spoke to its views on societal issues of 
considerable import, the fact that the “messages . . . [fell] short of refined 
social or political commentary” was insufficient to remove them from the 
public arena.148 Even the signs readily construed as directed specifically 
toward Matthew Snyder, such as “You’re Going to Hell” and “God Hates 
You,” were unpersuasive evidence that the speech was private, as “the 
overall thrust and dominant theme” of the demonstration pertained to 
important public issues.149 
Finally, Chief Justice Roberts found tort liability for IIED in these 
circumstances unpalatable because it would invariably depend on 
Westboro’s viewpoint.150 He reasoned that protestors standing in the same 
spot holding signs proclaiming “God Bless America” or “God Loves You” 
would never be subject to tort liability.151 Elementary First Amendment 
principles command that the “government may not prohibit the expression 
of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive.”152 The 
prohibition against viewpoint-based liability thus undermines IIED’s 
outrageousness standard, which Chief Justice Roberts saw as an invitation 
to the jury to impose liability based on its disdain for the message 
presented.153 The Court concluded that the First Amendment therefore 
requires society to tolerate insulting and outrageous speech on matters of 
public concern, lest the marketplace of ideas be denied adequate “breathing 
space.”154 
 
146 Id. at 1216 (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 
(1985) (plurality opinion)). 
147 Id. at 1216. 
148 Id. at 1217. 
149 Id. Westboro’s selection of a public street for protest further buttressed its case. Id. at 1218. 
Public spaces like these that are utilized for public assembly, demonstration, and debate have long 
received special protection. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939) 
(Roberts, J.). These public forums are still subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, 
and many states have enacted laws restricting funeral demonstrations. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1218. 
However, Maryland did not have such a statute in effect at the time of Matthew’s funeral. Id. 
150 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)). 
153 Id. 
154 Id. (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988)). 
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The majority opinion did not address the legal significance of the 
epic.155 In his concurrence, Justice Breyer pointed this out and emphasized 
the narrowness of the holding.156 Alone in dissent, Justice Alito could not 
ignore the epic, which he saw as evidence that the demonstration had been 
a personal attack on the Snyders.157 Furthermore, even if the protest 
generally regarded a matter of public concern, he did not think that 
Westboro could bury actionable speech targeting Matthew Snyder’s 
religion by interspersing it with protected speech protesting the war.158 
4. The First Amendment Straitjacket on IIED After Snyder.—Snyder 
further developed standards for when an IIED claim may proceed in the 
face of First Amendment concerns. Hustler disallows liability for anything 
short of actual malice when a public figure is the subject of the distressing 
publication. The Snyder Court assumed that Albert Snyder was a private 
figure, yet it insulated Westboro from liability for IIED. One might thus 
assume that private figures would have a difficult time succeeding on an 
IIED claim when the malefactors who torment them are speaking on a 
matter of public concern. 
Some peculiarities of the case temper such an inference by offering 
future courts reasonable bases on which to distinguish future IIED cases. 
First and foremost, the protesters stood 1,000 feet away and complied with 
the instructions of law enforcement. Furthermore, Albert Snyder did not 
see the placards they bore until he watched television later that evening. 
The protests took place in a traditional public forum, and while some of the 
attacks seemed personally directed at the Snyders, the “overall thrust and 
dominant theme” regarded an issue of public concern.159 These factors 
made a finding of liability difficult to fathom, produced a narrow opinion, 
and have led commentators to question its value and even the decision to 
grant certiorari in the first place.160 
Moreover, some exchanges at oral argument hinted that the analysis 
might have differed had Westboro engaged in protest that more 
aggressively and proximately confronted Snyder in person, or in other 
words, was more “up in [Snyder’s] grill.”161 In light of these potential 
 
155 Snyder did not include the epic in his cert. petition, which may have led the Court to decline 
including it in its discussion. Id. at 1214 n.1. 
156 Id. at 1221–22 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
157 Id. at 1225–26 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
158 Id. at 1226–27. Justice Alito also contended that the Fourth Circuit erred in its reliance on 
Milkovich, but did so solely on the grounds that Milkovich was a defamation case and thus did not apply 
to IIED actions. Id. at 1228. 
159 Id. at 1217 (majority opinion). 
160 See, e.g., Alan Brownstein & Vikram David Amar, Afterthoughts on Snyder v. Phelps, 
2011 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 43, 43 (suggesting that the Court did not need to grant certiorari in 
light of the resounding First Amendment victory given by the Fourth Circuit). 
161 Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, Snyder, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (No. 09-751). 
107:999 (2013) Distressing Speech 
1019 
caveats, it is necessary to outline those categories of speech that have been 
categorically excepted from First Amendment protections: fighting words 
and true threats. 
5. Speech of Lesser Value.—The Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence has made clear that certain types of low-value speech can be 
regulated and proscribed. Defamatory speech is subject to liability because 
of the potential for palpable reputational harm.162 The Court has likewise 
excluded from First Amendment protection speech that constitutes “no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and [that is of] such slight social 
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from [it] is 
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”163 Since 
Hustler, defamation law has had important collateral consequences for 
IIED.164 But two other low-value speech categories, fighting words and true 
threats, also may influence an analysis of speech protection in the context 
of IIED. 
a. Fighting words.—Beginning with its decision in Chaplinsky 
v. New Hampshire, the Court developed the fighting words doctrine to 
ensure that a state did not go too far in criminalizing speech that was 
“offensive, derisive, or annoying.”165 Under the fighting words rule, states 
may criminalize only those words that are so “opprobrious . . . or 
abusive . . . [that they] tend[] to cause a breach of the peace.”166 The exact 
scope of the doctrine has narrowed over time. When the Chaplinsky Court 
first announced it, the rule was broad enough to include words “which by 
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of 
the peace.”167 The fighting words doctrine thus permitted states to 
criminalize “disorderly words” that could cause deep offense.168 
Eventually, the Court began to pull back from the Chaplinsky 
standard. Reasoning that the Constitution protects the right of a speaker to 
express her emotions and that word choice affects the emotive impact of 
speech, Justice Harlan’s 1971 opinion in Cohen v. California169 refused to 
 
162 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2545 (2012). 
163 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). Chaplinsky featured a pamphleteer 
outside of city hall in Rochester, New Hampshire, who decried a city marshal as a “damned Fascist” 
and a “God damned racketeer” when attempts were made to move him. Id. at 569–70. 
164 See supra notes 79–90 and accompanying text. 
165 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569. 
166 Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 519, 523 (1972). 
167 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. 
168 See id. at 573. 
169 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). Cohen arose during the tumultuous days of the 
Vietnam War, when a man was arrested for wearing a jacket that said “Fuck the Draft” into the Los 
Angeles County Courthouse. Id. at 16. 
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allow the criminalization of offensive words.170 Liability could only be 
incurred for “personally abusive epithets” and “direct personal insult[s].”171 
Then, in Gooding v. Wilson, the doctrine settled in its current form when 
Justice Brennan excised offensive words from the test, limiting its scope to 
those words with “a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person 
to whom, individually, the remark is addressed.”172 
Finally, in 1992, the Court in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul173 applied the 
doctrine to a St. Paul hate-crime-prevention ordinance, which the 
Minnesota Supreme Court had interpreted as punishing only fighting 
words.174 A Justice Scalia-led majority found that even within an 
unprotected category of speech such as fighting words, an ordinance may 
not discriminate on the basis of content.175 Even though the ordinance 
permissibly contemplated fighting words, it punished only those fighting 
words that expressed racist ideas.176 The Court recalled the language of 
Chaplinsky, observing that fighting words are not “worthless and 
undeserving of constitutional protection . . . [and we] have not said that 
they constitute no part of the expression of ideas, but only that they 
constitute no essential part of any exposition of ideas.”177 
The R.A.V. Court went on to explain that the First Amendment permits 
the criminalization of fighting words not because they are without value but 
because they can trigger violence.178 The average community member will 
be unable to resist immediately breaching the peace in response to fighting 
words, and the government’s interest in avoiding this outcome outweighs 
the speech’s value. In light of this re-imagined rationale, the fighting words 
doctrine is extremely narrow: the government can punish only personally 
insulting words spoken in a face-to-face encounter that are likely to cause 
an immediate breach of the peace by the addressee, and only so long as the 
statute or ordinance does not penalize words based on their content or 
message. 
 
170 Id. at 26. Justice Harlan also famously quipped, “[O]ne man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.” Id. at 
25. 
171 Id. at 20. 
172 405 U.S. 518, 524 (1972) (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573) (internal quotation mark 
omitted). A man was convicted under a Georgia statute criminalizing “opprobrious words or abusive 
language” for saying to a police officer: “‘White son of a bitch, I’ll kill you . . . You son of a bitch, I’ll 
choke you to death . . . .’” Id. at 534 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
173 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
174 Id. at 380. 
175 Id. at 386. 
176 Id. at 391. 
177 Id. at 385 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
178 Id. at 386 (“[T]he exclusion of fighting words from the scope of the First Amendment simply 
means that, for the purposes of that Amendment, the unprotected features of the words are, despite their 
verbal character, essentially a nonspeech element of communication.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
107:999 (2013) Distressing Speech 
1021 
b. True threats.—The government may punish speech when it 
rises to the level of a true threat. However, the burden falls on the 
government to prove that the speech constitutes a true threat and not some 
kind of “political hyperbole.”179 The true threat standard requires that “the 
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit 
an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of 
individuals.”180 Even if the speaker has no intention of actually committing 
a violent act, the speech can still be punishable.181 Intimidation, which 
requires that a speaker direct a threat to an individual with “the intent of 
placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death,” is a subtype of true 
threat.182 The state’s interest in protecting its citizenry from the fear of 
violence and from the potential for violence itself justifies these 
restrictions.183 
The Court has not provided guidance on what constitutes a true threat 
beyond Virginia v. Black. The circuits have filled in the gaps with two 
types of tests: objective and subjective.184 A majority of the circuits uses an 
objective test, requiring the jury to determine if the alleged speech would 
be determined by a reasonable person to be a threat.185 An alternative 
subjective approach, advocated by Justice Marshall in Rogers v. United 
States, requires the speaker to actually intend to convey a threat.186 The 
Ninth187 and Fourth188 Circuits have used this test, but neither circuit has 
employed it consistently, and both have generally opted for an objective 
test.189 The Court’s definition of true threats in Black required a speaker to 
“mean[] to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act 
of unlawful violence,”190 which suggests a subjective intent requirement. 
However, subsequent courts have been unwilling to abandon the objective 
 
179 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam). 
180 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). 
181 Id. at 360. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 See Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
283, 302 (2002). 
185 Id. There is disagreement amongst courts that have adopted this approach as well; some have 
adopted a “reasonable listener” approach, while others have opted for a “reasonable speaker” method. 
Id. The Second Circuit uses an objective test but also requires that the violence threatened be imminent. 
United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1976). 
186 422 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
187 United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 1988). 
188 United States v. Patillo, 438 F.2d 13, 16 (4th Cir. 1971). 
189 Rothman, supra note 184, at 308. 
190 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). 
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approach on such a vague statement, and it is likely that it will remain the 
dominant standard.191 
6. Summarizing the Contours of IIED After Snyder.—The Court 
took pains to keep the Snyder decision narrow. However, the opinion’s 
logic makes it likely that IIED claims for pure speech related to public 
issues are barred unless the speech rises to the level of a true threat. Chief 
Justice Roberts emphasized that the protests took place from 1,000 feet 
away.192 But suppose the Westboro members with the same signs had 
conducted a protest in Albert Snyder’s face. A court confronting this 
situation would have had to decide whether the “overall thrust and 
dominant theme” of the speech concerned a public issue.193 If, as in Snyder, 
they concluded that it did, it would seem unlikely that the signs or abuses 
could constitute personally abusive epithets under the modern fighting 
words standard and would be immunized. 
The Court’s jurisprudence on true threats suggests that Snyder should 
not bar an IIED claim when the offending public speech constitutes a true 
threat. Speech on public issues may be more likely to fall into the “mere 
hyperbole” category that Watts protected,194 but even public speech could 
cause a reasonable listener to fear violence. For instance, a statement like 
“My kid died in the war you support; now I’m going to find your kids and 
kill them too” could rise to the level of a true threat if it were reasonable for 
the parents to fear for the safety of their child. Thus, Snyder should bar 
IIED claims when distressing speech relates to a matter of public concern, 
so long as that speech is not a true threat. The above explanation of the 
Court’s (somewhat cryptic) IIED pronouncements can therefore be 
synthesized to constitutionally bar IIED claims for most nondefamatory 
speech about public figures and when the speech is related to issues of 
public concern. In the next Part, I will explain why the First Amendment 
should also immunize distressing speech about a private figure that relates 
to a matter of private concern. 
II. TOWARDS PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE INJURIOUS SPEECH 
Immunizing would-be tortfeasors for distressing speech that is not a 
true threat and relates to a matter of public concern gives rise to two 
additional questions. First, how is one to distinguish between public and 
private matters? Second, may a private figure sue over speech that 
 
191 See, e.g., Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 616 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Black 
but still employing an objective standard); see also Paul T. Crane, Note, “True Threats” and the Issue 
of Intent, 92 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1261 (2006) (arguing that some courts interpreted Black to sanction the 
traditional objective approach). 
192 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1218 (2011). 
193 See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
194 See supra notes 179–83 and accompanying text. 
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intentionally caused her emotional distress with respect to a matter of 
private concern?195 
In the following sections, this Note gives three reasons why the First 
Amendment should bar most pure-speech IIED cases. First, it is ultimately 
too difficult to distinguish between public and private matters for that 
distinction to support a reliable legal test. Moreover, compensating 
emotional harm for nonthreatening speech runs a high risk of punishing 
speech for its viewpoint. Finally, nonfalse distressing speech related to a 
private matter is distinct from private defamatory speech because it has 
some value and therefore receives more protection. The First Amendment 
thus immunizes distressing, nonthreatening speech related to matters of 
private concern. With these constitutional limits in place, the final section 
of this Part addresses and refutes some potentially troubling consequences. 
A. Difficulties in Distinguishing Between Public and Private Matters 
Justice Alito was skeptical of the majority’s finding in Snyder that 
speech is a matter of public concern when its “overall thrust and dominant 
theme” regard a public issue.196 He saw no reason to excuse private barbs 
from liability just because the speaker surrounded them with protected 
public speech.197 Even setting aside Justice Alito’s concerns, the majority’s 
approach gives rise to significant questions. The Court indicated that 
matters of public concern encompass speech that “can be fairly considered 
as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the 
community, or [to the] subject of legitimate news interest.”198 But these 
principles do little more than restate the proposition that the First 
Amendment protects speech regarding a matter of public concern, and they 
will likely provide little guidance, especially in close cases. 
The line of related defamation jurisprudence, where similar 
determinations must be made, exemplifies the difficulty that can arise in 
determining whether a matter is of public or private concern. The 
inconsistent positions of Justices Powell and Brennan, two of the key 
architects of modern defamation law, show that a one-size-fits-all 
definition may be unattainable. In Gertz,199 Justice Powell expressed doubts 
about the ability of a court to differentiate between public and private 
matters and therefore determined that the inquiry should focus on the 
 
195 Notably, IIED cases involving distressing conduct, rather than pure speech, are irrelevant to this 
analysis. The First Amendment will not bar recovery for those forced to witness grisly and disturbing 
scenes of death or mutilation or those distressed by the intentional mishandling of a family member’s 
body. Rare situations such as these do not implicate constitutional concerns. 
196 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1226 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
197 Id. at 1226–27. 
198 Id. at 1216 (majority opinion) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983); City of 
San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
199 See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text. 
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plaintiff’s public or private status.200 Justice Brennan, in dissent, argued that 
the truly difficult inquiry is whether a person is a public figure.201 
Dun & Bradstreet202 found Justices Powell and Brennan once again at 
odds. This time, however, Justice Powell had no problem differentiating 
between public and private matters in finding an award of punitive 
damages appropriate in the context of a private matter.203 Justice Brennan, 
again in dissent, chastised the holding and retreated from his dissent in 
Gertz to argue that the plurality offered “nothing at all” in the way of 
guidance as to what constitutes a public concern.204 The only hallmark of 
private concern he gleaned from Justice Powell’s opinion was that the 
speech was related solely to a business audience and was “solely motivated 
by the desire for profit.”205 Justice Brennan then dismissed this as a basis 
for differentiating between public and private concern, as speech on 
economic matters is not entitled to less constitutional protection.206 
The challenges manifest in distinguishing between private and public 
concerns have been exacerbated by modern technology. The Internet has 
made widespread dissemination of ideas and personal information easier 
than at any time in history. This ubiquitous sharing of information and data 
has irrevocably blurred the line between public and private issues. Social 
networking sites and dynamic media platforms have made “public” 
information that in bygone eras may have been shared with only the most 
intimate of compatriots. Is personal information on a Facebook page 
strictly a matter of private concern? Does it remain so if the page is open to 
viewing from the public? Does the “publicness” of the information depend 
on how many visitors there are to the page? 
It is easy to imagine a difficult situation like this occurring in an IIED 
claim. Suppose an irate teenager posts a video on YouTube excoriating a 
former friend after the two have a falling-out. The clip reveals 
embarrassing information about the former friend’s sexual proclivities, 
verbally assaults her, and causes her great emotional distress. Nothing in 
the clip has anything to do with a traditional matter of public concern. Now 
suppose that the clip goes viral and gets 1,000,000 hits and is subsequently 
featured on television shows that harvest popular clips from the Internet.207 
It could no longer be gainsaid that the clip is private. While some might 
 
200 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974). 
201 Id. at 363–64 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 
46–47 (1971)). 
202 See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text. 
203 472 U.S. 749, 761–62 (1985). 
204 Id. at 786–87 (Brennan, J. dissenting). 
205 Id. at 787. 
206 Id. (citing Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501–02 (1952); Am. Fed’n of Labor v. 
Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 325–26 (1941); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101–03 (1940)). 
207 See, e.g., Tosh.0 (Comedy Central television broadcast). 
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argue that public availability does not make something a matter of public 
concern, if enough people wish to access speech, it becomes public, 
regardless of its embarrassing or distressing content. It would be difficult to 
draw a definitive line where speech becomes a matter of public concern, 
and the arbitrariness of the exercise counsels against undertaking the 
determination. Distinguishing between matters of public and private 
concern was a confounding and controversial task for Justices Brennan and 
Powell. Modern technology has ratcheted up this difficulty by blurring the 
line between the media and consumers, and it is therefore inadvisable to 
allow IIED liability to hinge on such a questionable determination. 
B. The Danger of Punishing Speech Based on Viewpoint 
In Snyder, the Court did not confine its criticism of IIED to the fact 
that Westboro’s speech related to issues of public concern. Chief Justice 
Roberts pointed out that the same protesters, holding signs of “God Bless 
America” and “God Loves You,” would not have been subject to tort 
liability and that IIED liability therefore punished Westboro for the 
unpopularity of its message.208 The opinion also expressed general 
discomfort with IIED’s outrageousness standard.209 
Outrageousness defies precise definition, but from its inception, courts 
have cast it as an objective standard210: generally, only speech that would 
outrage “an average member of the community” is subject to liability.211 
Juries must therefore tackle the imprecise task of ascertaining the values of 
this community everyman. Average community sensibilities are dynamic 
and vary depending on the population included in the “community.”212 In 
practice, the “community standard” is often similar to a reasonableness 
standard.213 Jurors, sure to think themselves “reasonable people,” will be 
tempted to elevate their own subjectivities into their determinations. Hence, 
this standard invites jurors in any IIED case to insert their own values into 
determining outrageousness.214 In so doing, jurors may impose liability 
based on their “tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a 
particular expression.”215 Unpopular and caustic views are more likely to 
 
208 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011). 
209 Id. 
210 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965). 
211 Id. 
212 See Bradley J. Shafer & Andrea E. Adams, Jurisprudence of Doubt: Obscenity, Indecency, and 
Morality at the Dawn of the 21st Century, MICH. B.J., June 2005, at 22, 24. 
213 See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 501 n.3 (1987) (noting in the obscenity context that a 
reasonableness standard is functionally similar to a “contemporary community standard[]”). 
214 See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510 (1984). 
215 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988). 
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outrage jurors, regardless of whether the speech relates to a matter of public 
or private concern.216 
Even assuming a juror is able to resist favoring her own views and 
faithfully apply the norms of the community, those with the most offensive 
views and the sharpest tongues risk upsetting the sensibilities of twelve of 
their peers and incurring liability.217 A statement that is outrageous to 
ninety-nine percent of the community is not to the remaining one percent, 
including the speaker. The First Amendment forbids the sensibilities of the 
ninety-nine percent from punishing the viewpoint of the one percent.218 The 
outrageousness standard, in the hands of a jury, poses a “real danger” of 
serving as an instrument of suppression for unpopular and offensive 
speech.219 
Punishing speech based on viewpoint is anathema to the “bedrock 
principle underlying the First Amendment . . . that the government may not 
prohibit [or punish] the expression of an idea simply because society finds 
the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”220 By enforcing a jury verdict, the 
government is sanctioning the “average” view of outrageousness and 
thereby punishing speech for its viewpoint. While IIED claims differ from 
traditional speech restrictions because they arise in the context of a civil 
suit rather than by statute,221 the exercise of judicial power is nevertheless 
state action subject to the First Amendment.222 If the government tried to 
pass a statute banning or restricting outrageous speech to promote the 
public’s peace of mind, it would almost certainly fail.223 Allowing a jury to 
penalize an offensive speaker with tort liability is to “allow the government 
to produce a result which [it] could not command directly” through 
statute.224 
The result in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul225 further illustrates the 
constitutional flaws of penalizing outrageous speech. Writing for the Court, 
Justice Scalia refused to sanction a statute that reached only unprotected 
fighting words, underscoring the First Amendment’s hostility toward 
 
216 See Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 510. 
217 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011). 
218 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (collecting caselaw). 
219 Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 510. 
220 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414. 
221 See, e.g., id. at 400–02 (holding that a conviction for violation of a flag burning statute could 
not stand under the First Amendment). 
222 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (“It matters not that that law has been 
applied in a civil action and that it is common law only . . . . The test is not the form in which state 
power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised.”). 
223 See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 527 (1972). 
224 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (alteration in original) (quoting Speiser v. 
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
225 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
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viewpoint- and content-based regulations.226 St. Paul would have been free 
in that case to pass a statute criminalizing all fighting words, but it could 
not constitutionally criminalize only racist fighting words.227 
A similar problem arises in IIED claims. Private, outrageous speech 
may rise to the level of fighting words.228 However, not all fighting words 
will be outrageous enough to support an IIED claim. There are many 
“invitation[s] to exchange fisticuffs”229 that would not strike the average 
community member as outrageous. Moreover, fighting words are 
proscribable because of their ability to cause a breach of the peace, not 
because of their outrageousness. “The proposition that a particular instance 
of speech can be proscribable on the basis of one feature . . . but not on the 
basis of another . . . is commonplace.”230 To reserve liability only for those 
particular fighting words a jury finds outrageous thus unconstitutionally 
discriminates on the basis of the speech’s content and viewpoint.231 
True threats present a different scenario. Like fighting words, they can 
be punishable on the basis of one feature (e.g., placing in fear of violence) 
and not on the basis of another (e.g., outrageousness).232 IIED actions that 
are brought as a pretext to punish fighting words attempt to punish the 
words for the internal distress caused by their offensiveness. Such suits do 
not align with the reason fighting words are unprotected: the words’ ability 
to act as a trigger to action and cause a breach of the peace. An IIED action 
against a true threat, however, seeks to punish speech for placing the 
listener in the distress that accompanies the anticipation of violence. This 
internal distress and fear is the evil that the true threats doctrine seeks to 
combat, and it is being curtailed by IIED actions just as it would under a 
criminal statute. Courts in IIED claims therefore could introduce a 
presumption that all true threats are sufficiently outrageous to support 
liability. Alternatively, every jurisdiction could criminalize true threats or 
create a private cause of action, which would make the IIED claim for a 
true threat unnecessary.233 Ultimately, this difficulty illustrates how the 
entire enterprise of subjecting outrageous speech to tort liability is 
problematic because of the invitation to punish speech for its viewpoint 
alone. 
 
226 Id. at 381. 
227 Id. at 384–86. 
228 Private barbs may qualify as fighting words even after the narrowing of the doctrine to include 
only those “words that have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, 
individually, the remark is addressed.” Gooding, 405 U.S. at 524 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
229 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989). 
230 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 385. 
231 Id. at 384–86. 
232 Id. at 385. 
233 Many states have already enacted statutes criminalizing or prohibiting various types of 
threatening speech and behavior. See Rothman, supra note 184, at 366 & n.334. 
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C. The Value of Private, Injurious Speech 
First Amendment jurisprudence requires that courts balance society’s 
interest in regulating speech against the value of the speech itself. In the 
IIED context, not only does the potential for viewpoint-based censorship 
interfere impermissibly with protected First Amendment interests, 
offensive speech also has positive value. It may seem counterintuitive to 
propose that we should value malicious and injurious speech,234 and it may 
not receive the same level of First Amendment protection as core political 
speech.235 But several commentators have argued that speech can be 
valuable for more reasons than its ability to contribute to the public 
discourse. Because of its subjectivity, tort law is only an appropriate 
mechanism for speech regulation in those areas of speech that the Court has 
deemed completely unprotected, such as defamation or true threats, and 
cannot be employed for an IIED action unless the speech falls into such a 
category.236 In the following sections, the contributions of these scholars 
and jurists are laid out, the standard is applied, and an opposing viewpoint 
is rebutted. 
1. Methods of Valuing Private, Injurious Speech.—Many 
commentators rely on a “marketplace of ideas” paradigm to suggest that 
speech about political matters or which relates to self-governance occupies 
the highest rung on the hierarchy of speech.237 Others, however, point to a 
different paradigm. Professors Baker and Redish argue that to tie speech’s 
value solely to the marketplace of ideas or political self-governance unduly 
limits the scope of the First Amendment. 
Professor Baker contends that the classical marketplace of ideas theory 
is insufficient and proposes instead what he calls a liberty model.238 He 
argues that the purpose of free speech is to protect the value it has to the 
individual, rather than some greater societal good.239 Focusing on individual 
autonomy, Baker urges protection of any speech that helps to define or 
develop one’s sense of self.240 Regardless of the effect it might have on 
 
234 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
235 See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 
1, 20 (1971) (contending that the First Amendment should protect political speech alone). 
236 The Court has indicated that it is not interested in carving out any new categories of unprotected 
speech, so it is unlikely that it would do so for private distressing speech. United States v. Stevens, 130 
S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010) (declining to carve out a category of unprotected speech for depictions of 
animal cruelty and explaining that new categories of unprotected speech should be identified only in the 
rarest of circumstances). 
237 See e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF 
THE PEOPLE 24–28 (1960); Bork, supra note 235, at 20. 
238 See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 
964 (1978). 
239 Id. at 966. 
240 Id. at 992. 
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others, Baker argues, speech deserves constitutional protection when it 
leads to self-fulfillment, self-expression, or autonomy.241 
Like Baker, Professor Redish acknowledges self-expression as the 
core element that makes speech worthy of protection, but he argues that 
Baker’s theory does not go far enough in protecting an individual’s right to 
self-actualize.242 Redish further argues that our focus on so-called political 
speech captures just a sliver of the overall picture. To him, the true values 
of speech are the “intrinsic” value of individual control of one’s own 
destiny and the “instrumental” value of developing one’s human 
faculties.243 While angry and hurtful outbursts on the street may not develop 
a speaker’s intellectual faculties, Professor Redish points out that the 
human experience contains “an emotional element . . . that can be 
‘developed’ by such ‘non-rational’ forms of communication.”244 
In addition to the potential value of private, distressing speech to the 
individual speaker, it can also hold value in the marketplace of ideas as 
conceptualized in the American constitutional consciousness. The 
marketplace is not always a place for the reasoned exchange of competing 
ideas in the search for truth,245 nor is it concerned only with political speech 
or speech related to self-governance.246 Under these metrics, it might be 
difficult to place value on private, distressing speech. However, the vision 
of the marketplace that permeates First Amendment thought is considerably 
less refined. The Court has emphasized: “[A] function of free speech . . . is 
to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces 
a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or 
even stirs people to anger.”247 
This notion of an unrefined, rough-and-tumble marketplace of ideas 
can be detected in the writings of Justice Holmes, whose dissent in Abrams 
v. United States is often cited as a foundation of the marketplace 
paradigm.248 While Justice Holmes’s elegant, short prose is often held out 
as a simple tribute to the free exchange of ideas, closer examination shows 
a more layered complexity.249 Justice Holmes was skeptical about the 
notion of absolute truth, once suggesting that truth is “the majority vote of 
that nation that could lick all others.”250 He was also a noted Social 
 
241 Id. at 994. 
242 See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 619–22 (1982). 
243 See id. at 602–03. 
244 Id. at 628. 
245 See JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, THE 
SUBJECTION OF WOMEN: THREE ESSAYS 5, 22–27 (Oxford Univ. Press 1960) (1859). 
246 See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 237. 
247 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). 
248 250 U.S. 616, 630–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
249 Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2. 
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Darwinist—a firm believer in the survival of the fittest.251 These values 
contributed to the way that Justice Holmes viewed the marketplace of 
ideas. Rather than Mill’s conception of a place where dissenting opinions 
and viewpoints contribute to the collective knowledge and good of society, 
Justice Holmes saw the protection of speech as essential to the power 
struggle between different factions trying to gain dominance with the 
superiority of their ideas.252 
Viewing the American marketplace as Justice Holmes did, speech 
need not be protected as a utilitarian instrument working towards some 
common good. The marketplace can also protect speakers and act as an 
invaluable counterweight to the status quo, by allowing unpopular 
dissidents to voice controversial and unpopular opinions. Offensive and 
injurious ideas have a place in this marketplace; they can challenge the 
establishment’s conceptions of outrageousness and help speakers and 
factions advance their agendas, however unpopular. It should not be 
troubling if “the air [is] at times . . . filled with verbal cacophony[, which 
is] not a sign of weakness but of strength.”253 
2. Consequences of Attributing Value.—If we view hurtful and 
distressing statements through one of these frames, we can imagine value 
to the speech. Suppose a malicious citizen approaches a grieving neighbor 
that he knows to have recently lost a child and tells him, “I’m glad your son 
died. He was an annoying little boy, and we are much better off without 
him.” Assuming these words are outrageous, they are not valueless simply 
because they were directed at a private person about a private matter. Even 
disfavored categories of speech are not completely valueless; the Court has 
merely determined that the social harm they cause outweighs their slight 
value.254 Speech that crosses that line into one of these categories is 
unprotected only because at that point society’s interest in avoiding the 
harm it causes exceeds its value. 
Perhaps by hurling hurtful invectives, the neighbor is able to throw off 
his inhibitions about speaking his mind and therefore become a more 
complete person (albeit one in need of considerable refinement). Perhaps 
the unmannered brute has had a terrible day and is on the verge of 
explosion when he is able to blow off some steam by attacking his 
neighbor. Even if the person is just an ill-tempered eugenicist and actually 
wishes for the death of annoying children, expressing this sentiment may 
be quite fulfilling. 
 
251 See Irene M. Ten Cate, Speech, Truth, and Freedom: An Examination of John Stuart Mill’s and 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s Free Speech Defenses, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 35, 58–61 (2010). 
252 Id. at 39–40. 
253 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971). 
254 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 384–85 (1992). 
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Professor Smolla has expressed concern about a First Amendment bar 
to IIED claims by a private person regarding a private matter.255 He fears 
constitutional schema would end up swallowing the entire tort, and he 
considers IIED doctrine sufficient to protect speech with constitutional 
value.256 He takes a cue from Dun & Bradstreet in reaching his conclusion 
that the First Amendment has little to say about distressing speech towards 
a private person about a matter of private concern. But the material 
difference between Dun & Bradstreet and the dead-child scenario is the 
value of the speech. The false credit scores in Dun & Bradstreet were 
completely unprotected because they were false and defamatory.257 While 
we do often protect defamatory statements, it is because we seek to avoid 
incidentally chilling valuable speech, not because of the value in the 
defamatory falsehoods themselves.258 It is only when speech about a private 
matter is directed at a private person, as in Dun & Bradstreet, that our fear 
of speech chilling subsides enough to allow liability upon a showing of 
mere negligence.259 As hurtful as the cruel neighbor’s comment is, it is not 
a false and defamatory statement, nor does it fall into another forbidden 
category of speech. An IIED action against the discourteous neighbor 
undermines the value of the comment at the expense of the historically 
disfavored interest in emotional tranquility. Unlike in the context of a 
defamation action like Dun & Bradstreet, the First Amendment bars this 
IIED action. 
Of course assigning value to private, distressing speech does not mean 
that it can never be regulated. The value of the speech to the speaker must 
be balanced against the listener’s right not to be disturbed and society’s 
interest in tranquility. The speech could therefore be subject to reasonable 
time, place, and manner restrictions.260 What makes the current structure for 
IIED claims so problematic is the inconsistency and subjectivity that are 
unavoidable in the application of an outrageousness standard. If the state 
wished to protect the tranquility of its citizens, it could enact a speech 
restriction that met the requirements of time, place, and manner 
restrictions.261 
There have been and will be plenty of situations where speech directed 
at a private person on an issue of private concern may be sufficiently 
outrageous that a jury would assign liability if permitted. Smolla suggested 
that in such situations, the First Amendment should yield and state tort law 
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should control.262 But because of the difficulty in distinguishing between 
public and private matters, the danger of punishing speech based on its 
viewpoint, and the value of distressing speech itself, the First Amendment 
should bar all pure-speech IIED claims not arising out of true threats. 
D. Potential Consequences of Protecting Private, Offensive Speech 
Adopting a First Amendment bar to IIED claims could raise concerns 
in certain situations. Today, many IIED claims may arise out of speech in 
the workplace or on the Internet. There are doubtless other situations where 
imposing a constitutional bar to IIED actions could create controversy, and 
the following discussion is not intended to be exhaustive. The case of 
sexually harassing speech illustrates a situation where a statutory remedy 
may be appropriate but the vagueness of IIED is not. Online speech is 
discussed because Justice Breyer specifically singled it out. At least in 
these two contexts, the First Amendment must bar IIED claims so long as 
the speech is not a true threat. 
1. Sexually Harassing Speech.—Sexually harassing speech and other 
controversial speech in the workplace pose potential problems. Of course if 
sexually harassing speech were to put the addressee in fear of violence, it 
would be a true threat and the First Amendment should allow an IIED 
claim to proceed.263 However, most harassment will be unlikely to rise to 
the level of a true threat. Because an IIED action would be left trying to 
compensate pure emotional harm, it should therefore be constitutionally 
barred. 
Thankfully, victims of sexual harassment will not be remediless. 
Commentators have observed that the state’s interest in preventing a hostile 
work environment is strong enough to overcome the value of sexually 
harassing speech in large part because sexual harassment constitutes sex 
discrimination and leads to gender segregation.264 This means that the state 
has a compelling interest in punishing this type of speech. Indeed, 
assuming the harassment takes place in the workplace, the victims of these 
comments may have a remedy under Title VII265 and various state 
statutes,266 which function as time, place, and manner restrictions to 
 
262 See Smolla, supra note 85, at 473. 
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vindicate the state’s interests.267 Such a restriction has an especially low bar 
to meet in the employment context as it generally takes place in a 
nonpublic forum.268 Speech restrictions in this context need only be 
reasonable and not viewpoint based.269 Anti-harassment statutes are content 
based—they forbid speech related to a specific subject matter—but they are 
not viewpoint based as they apply regardless of the specific sentiment 
expressed in the sexual communication. There is therefore no infirmity to 
statutory remedies in workplace claims, and those who are harassed will 
not be remediless, nor will employers be hamstrung. Sexually harassing 
speech thus provides a useful example of a situation where a statutory 
remedy is appropriate but the First Amendment bars the vagaries of the tort 
law in an IIED claim, unless the speech is a true threat. 
2. The Impact of the Internet.—Today, the Internet and the 
accompanying avalanche of media technologies have revolutionized the 
way people interact and communicate with one another. Information moves 
more rapidly, and across greater distances, than the architects of IIED could 
ever have imagined. Information can now reach almost anyone, practically 
instantaneously, and new media blurs the once-bright lines between 
newsmaker, news reporter, and news consumer. This process has further 
complicated the already difficult task of distinguishing between speech of 
public and private concern.270 
But this communicative revolution has its downside. Exploitive, 
defamatory, misleading, and injurious speech now enjoys the same ease of 
dissemination as its more laudable counterparts. The Internet allows 
unfiltered and abrasive messages to reach a wider audience than more 
tightly controlled traditional media outlets; a malicious message board 
poster can reach thousands of readers instantly. Moreover, e-mail, 
Facebook, Twitter, and the like leave indelible records; the injury can thus 
persist for longer than a traumatic comment delivered in person. For 
example, the epic in Snyder continued to torment and exacerbate the 
emotional suffering of Albert Snyder even after pain from the initial trauma 
on the day of the funeral may have otherwise begun to dull.271 
 
267 Title VII harassment law may itself be the subject of constitutional controversy. For a 
discussion of Title VII harassment claims and possible First Amendment challenges to the law, see 
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It is hard to see why the First Amendment should protect speech of 
public concern online any differently than in the pages of a magazine.272 
While an incendiary website such as Westboro’s may be extremely 
offensive, there is no principled reason for treating these platforms any 
differently than a newspaper or other traditional media outlet, and to 
protect the distressing speech published unless it is a true threat.273 
Moreover, the Internet also provides a ready forum for counter-speech—
the provision of additional speech to counteract the deleterious effects of 
harmful speech is typically the preferred method of minimizing harm.274 Of 
course, Westboro’s epic in Snyder was an example of speech that may have 
related to private matters.275 Though the Court did not address the epic in its 
opinion, the dynamic medium of the Internet seemed to concern Justice 
Breyer during Snyder’s oral arguments,276 and his concurrence stressed that 
the Court’s majority opinion did not reach these issues.277 But Justice 
Breyer did not take a firm position, and he indicated he was unsure what 
the rule should be in cases involving online IIED.278 
Whether the injurious speech appears on a personal webpage, a 
message board, Facebook, or via e-mail should not affect the basic analytic 
framework. Take a hypothetical Facebook message sent to a private party 
by a former friend after a falling-out. In the message, the sender writes, 
“I’m sure everyone thinks you’re an asshole and a self-righteous piece of 
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shit. You are so ugly and boring that it would be better off for everyone if 
you would just crawl into a hole and die!” This unrefined tirade has 
value.279 It is also not defamatory nor does it fall into one of the other 
unprotected categories of speech. Such invectives certainly have the 
potential to cause distress, and perhaps more so if the sender opts for a 
publicly viewable online forum. Still, the difficulties in punishing this 
speech using tort law are too great, and IIED is an inappropriate tool for 
targeting the evils of this speech.280 This speech should therefore receive 
First Amendment protection unless it rose to the level of a true threat, 
which would leave the speech unprotected and appropriate for tort 
liability.281 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Court has not yet considered whether the First 
Amendment protects emotionally distressing speech directed at a private 
person regarding a matter of private concern, it should find such speech to 
be protected. Tort law and the outrageousness standard is an inappropriate 
vehicle for punishing this type of speech. The Internet and new media have 
blurred the line between public and private matters, a development that has 
increasingly rendered the old distinctions both impracticable and obsolete. 
Moreover, the outrageousness standard does little more than invite a jury to 
punish speech based on its viewpoint alone—a result forbidden by the First 
Amendment. Finally, injurious private speech has value both to the speaker 
and in the uniquely American marketplace of ideas. Of course, when the 
First Amendment protects speech, its protection is not absolute, and words 
that independently constitute true threats should continue to support IIED 
liability. Ultimately, this standard will leave some people exposed to 
injurious, hurtful, and personal commentary without legal recourse. But 
once we accept that the First Amendment protects almost all speech—not 
just political speech or speech regarding matters of public concern—we 
must acknowledge that even those of us who are not public figures must 
press on in the face of “vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly 
sharp attacks.”282 
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